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BARK WITH NO BITE: HOW THE
INEVITABLE DISCOVERY RULE IS
UNDERMINING THE SUPREME COURT’S
DECISION IN ARIZONA V. GANT
SCOTT R. GRUBMAN *
In 2009, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Arizona v. Gant, in
which it significantly limited the search incident to arrest exception in the
automobile search context. Despite what many experts predicted, Gant did
not open the floodgates of evidence suppression. This is because the Gant
holding is substantially undermined by the inevitable discovery rule, under
which otherwise illegally-seized evidence is deemed admissible under
certain circumstances. This article discusses why the Court’s decision in
Gant lacks real-world, practical effect, and how the Court can close the
loophole in its Gant holding.
I. INTRODUCTION
The late scholar Karl Llewellyn wrote that “the rule follows where its
reason leads; where the reason stops, there stops the rule.”1 Apart from the
poetic and literary value of this quotation, Professor Llewellyn’s point is
quite simple and abundantly relevant in all areas of the law: when a rule is
created for certain reasons, and those reasons cease to exist, the rule should
no longer be applied. Courts have utilized Professor Llewellyn’s axiom in
various areas of the law, refusing to apply rules to situations in which the
reasons justifying the rules are no longer present. 2

*
Trial Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice. Special thanks to Robert H. Snyder, Jr. for
his invaluable insight and assistance. The views expressed in this Article are those of the
author and are not necessarily the views of the Department of Justice.
1
K.N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 189 (Oceana
Publications, Inc. 1981) (1930) (emphasis omitted).
2
See, e.g., Aetna Life & Cas. Co. v. Barthelemy, 33 F.3d 189, 193 (3d Cir. 1994)
(applying Llewellyn’s principle in insurance context); Anderson v. United Tel. Co. of Kan.,
933 F.2d 1500, 1504 (10th Cir. 1991) (applying principle in context of motion for directed
verdict); G. & T. Terminal Packaging Co. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 830 F.2d 1230, 1238 (3d
Cir. 1987) (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (applying principle in context of federal preemption).
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However, in at least one area of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence—
the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement—the
Supreme Court of the United States has refused to apply Llewellyn’s
principle. In Chimel v. California, 3 the Supreme Court discussed the twin
rationales for the search incident to arrest exception—the need to disarm the
arrestee and to discover and preserve evidence. 4 Despite these stated
rationales, for years the Court expanded the search incident to arrest
doctrine well beyond that which was necessary to accomplish its dual
purposes. Nowhere was this more apparent than in the automobile context:
once an occupant or a recent occupant of a vehicle was placed under arrest,
the police were permitted to conduct a full search of the vehicle’s passenger
compartment as well any containers therein, including consoles, glove
compartments, luggage, and bags. 5 Further, the police did not lose this
authority when the arrestee was handcuffed in the back of a patrol car at the
time of the search and, therefore, could not possibly grab a weapon or hide
evidence. 6 As Justice O’Connor wrote in a concurring opinion, “court
decisions seem[ed] . . . to treat the ability to search a vehicle incident to the
arrest of a recent occupant as a police entitlement rather than as an
exception justified by the twin rationales of Chimel v. California.” 7
In 2009, when the search incident to arrest exception seemed to have
no limits in the automobile context, the Supreme Court issued its decision
in Arizona v. Gant. 8 In Gant, the Court seemed to reverse its previous
course by severely limiting an officer’s authority to search a vehicle when
the arrestee is detained and therefore cannot access weapons or evidence. 9
The Court in Gant held that the twin rationales articulated in Chimel allow
vehicle searches “incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only when the
arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger
compartment at the time of the search,” 10 or “when it is ‘reasonable to
believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the
vehicle.’” 11 Gant was immediately hailed by legal commentators and law
enforcement experts alike as a landmark case in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. The Court’s decision in Gant both provided hope to many,
3

395 U.S. 752 (1969).
Id. at 763–64.
5
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460–61 (1981).
6
See infra Part II.B.3.
7
Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 624 (2004) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
8
129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009).
9
Id. at 1719.
10
Id.
11
Id.
4
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including civil libertarians and defense lawyers, and frightened many
others, including law enforcement interest groups and prosecutors.12
However, despite what many experts predicted, Gant has not opened
the floodgates of evidence suppression. This is because Gant has primarily
been undermined by another exception to the warrant requirement that
allows otherwise illegally obtained evidence to be admitted if the
government can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the items
seized inevitably would have been discovered during a subsequent and
lawful inventory search of the vehicle.13 It appears that the Court’s
landmark decision in Gant has had little practical effect on the availability
or exclusion of evidence.
In this Article, I will discuss the search incident to arrest exception to
the warrant requirement from the origins of the doctrine to the Court’s most
recent decisions. Part II of the Article discusses the history of the search
incident to arrest exception, both in general and within the automobile
context. Part III discusses the Court’s recent decision in Gant. Part IV
explains why the practical effects of Gant are not as significant as some
may have hoped them to be and suggests several ways in which the Court
could close the loophole in its holding in Gant.
II. BACKGROUND
A. HISTORY OF THE SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST EXCEPTION

In 1914, the Supreme Court mentioned, in dicta, what would
subsequently become one of the most widely utilized, and perhaps widely
abused, exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement: the
search incident to a lawful arrest exception.14 In Weeks v. United States,15 a
case known for its establishment of the exclusionary rule, the Court stated:
12
See, e.g., Ken Wallentine, PoliceOne Analysis: Arizona v. Gant, POLICEONE.COM
(Apr. 22, 2009), http://www.policeone.com/legal/articles/1813475-PoliceOne-AnalysisArizona-v- Gant/ (discussing concerns over the Gant decision). In a New York Times article
written the same day Gant was decided, William J. Johnson, the executive director of the
National Association of Police Organizations, had this to say about the Court’s decision:
“It’s just terrible . . . . It’s certainly going to result in less drug and weapons cases being
made.” Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Cuts Back Officers’ Searches of Vehicles, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 21, 2009, at A12.
13
See infra note 220.
14
For a further discussion of the potential for abuse of the search incident to arrest
exception, see Wayne A. Logan, An Exception Swallows a Rule: Police Authority to Search
Incident to Arrest, 19 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 381, 396 (2001); Michael Schoen, Garcia v.
State: A Recent Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Decision Resolves the Texas Pretext
Debate in Favor of an Objective Approach, 45 BAYLOR L. REV. 781, 784 (1993).
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What then is the present case? Before answering that inquiry specifically, it may be
well by a process of exclusion to state what it is not. It is not an assertion of the right
on the part of the Government, always recognized under English and American law,
to search the person of the accused when legally arrested to discover and seize the
fruits or evidence of crime. This right has been uniformly maintained in many
16
cases.

Although the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant
requirement was not directly at issue in Weeks, the Supreme Court
nonetheless offered its express support for that common law doctrine. 17
However, because the doctrine was not at issue in that case, the Weeks
Court failed to discuss its contours. For instance, the Court did not discuss
whether the search incident to arrest doctrine allowed officers to search the
place where an arrest occurs. 18 Instead, the language of Weeks only
approved of the practice of searching the person of an arrestee in order to
discover and seize fruits or evidence of crime. 19
The Court elaborated on the search incident to arrest doctrine eleven
years after Weeks, in Carroll v. United States. 20 The defendants in Caroll
were convicted of transporting intoxicating liquors in an automobile. 21
They argued that the trial court erred when it admitted two of the bottles
that were found in their vehicle during a search subsequent to their arrest.22
According to the defendants, that search and seizure violated the Fourth
Amendment and, therefore, the court should have excluded the evidence. 23
In upholding the convictions, the Court cited its earlier decision in Weeks
and, in fact, elaborated on that previous dicta, holding that “[w]hen a man is
legally arrested for an offense, whatever is found upon his person or in his
control which it is unlawful for him to have and which may be used to
prove the offense may be seized and held as evidence in the prosecution.”24
However, as the Supreme Court subsequently stated, the Court’s assertion

15

232 U.S. 383 (1914).
Id. at 392.
17
See Michael Goodin, Arizona v. Gant: The Supreme Court Gets It Right (Almost), 87
U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 115, 119–20 (2010) (discussing history of search incident to arrest
exception, including Weeks).
18
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 755 (1969).
19
Id.; Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392.
20
267 U.S. 132 (1924).
21
Id. at 134.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id. at 158 (emphasis added).
16
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in Carroll “was far from a claim that the ‘place’ where one is arrested may
be searched so long as the arrest is valid.” 25
However, in the same year that Carroll was decided, the Supreme
Court issued its decision in Agnello v. United States. 26 In Agnello, the
Court once again expanded the scope of the common law search incident to
arrest exception to the warrant requirement, making it applicable not only to
a search of the arrestee’s person, but also to a search of the place where the
arrest is made. 27 Citing both Weeks and Carroll, the Agnello Court held:
The right without a search warrant contemporaneously to search persons lawfully
arrested while committing a crime and to search the place where the arrest is made in
order to find and seize things connected with the crime as its fruits or as the means by
which it was committed, as well as weapons and other things to effect an escape from
28
custody, is not to be doubted.

This rule from Agnello was solidified two years later in Marron v.
United States. 29 In Marron, federal prohibition agents obtained a warrant to
search a particular location being leased by the defendant. 30 The search
warrant authorized the agents to seize any intoxicating liquors and articles
for their manufacture. 31 When agents arrived at the location to execute the
search warrant, the defendant was not there, but they found evidence that
the property was being used for the sale and consumption of intoxicating
liquors. 32 After placing one individual under arrest, the agents searched for
and found large quantities of liquor, some of which was in a closet.33 While
searching that closet, they noticed a ledger showing inventories of liquors,
receipts, and expenses. 34 They also found a number of bills in the
defendant’s name for gas, electric, water, and telephone service.35 They
seized both the ledger and the bills. 36
Prior to trial, the defendant moved to suppress the ledger and bills,
arguing that these items were seized in violation of the Fourth

25

Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 756 (1969).
269 U.S. 20 (1925).
27
See Goodin, supra note 17, at 120.
28
Agnello, 269 U.S. at 30 (citing Carroll, 267 U.S. at 158; Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383, 392 (1914)).
29
275 U.S. 192 (1927).
30
Id. at 193.
31
Id.
32
Id. at 193–94.
33
Id. at 194.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
26
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Amendment. 37 Specifically, the defendant argued that because the ledger
and bills were not described in the warrant and because he was not arrested
with them on his person, their seizure was illegal.38 The Government
responded that the seizure was justified as either incident to the execution of
the search warrant or as incident to the arrest made while executing the
warrant. 39 In affirming the defendant’s conviction, the Court held that
because the agents made a lawful arrest, “[t]hey had a right without a
warrant contemporaneously to search the place in order to find and seize the
things used to carry on the criminal enterprise.” 40 After Agnello and
Marron, police could utilize the search incident to arrest exception to justify
a warrantless search of both the arrestee’s person and the place where the
arrest was made.
However, it did not take long for the Supreme Court to limit its
holding in Marron. In Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 41 after
federal agents placed several individuals under arrest for dealing in
intoxicating liquors, the agents conducted a search of the offenders’
offices. 42 During this search, through the threat of force, the agents gained
access to a locked desk and safe, from which they took certain papers. 43
The agents also searched other parts of the office and seized more papers. 44
The defendants in Go-Bart moved to exclude the papers that were seized
during the search. 45 The Court in Go-Bart assumed, without deciding, that
the arrests made in that case were lawful, despite being made without a
warrant. 46 The Court then discussed whether the search and seizure were
justified in light of the lawful arrests. In describing the incident, the Court
noted that the officers did not observe any crime and that although the
officer in charge “had an abundance of information and time to swear out a
valid warrant, he failed to do so.” 47 The Court went on to distinguish the
case before it from Marron, noting that the officers in Marron were
executing a valid search warrant, the arrestee was actively engaged in
37

Id.
Id.
39
Id. at 194–95.
40
Id. at 199 (citing Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925); Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 158 (1924); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914)).
41
282 U.S. 344 (1931).
42
Id. at 349.
43
Id. at 349–50.
44
Id. at 350.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 356.
47
Id. at 358.
38
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illegal activity, and “[t]here was no threat of force or general search or
rummaging” because the items seized “were visible and accessible.” 48
Based on the facts of the case before it, the Court in Go-Bart held that the
search conducted was unreasonable and, therefore, that the evidence should
be suppressed. 49
Just one year after Go-Bart was decided, the Court decided another
case in which it limited the applicability of its holding in Marron. In
United States v. Lefkowitz, federal prohibition agents applied for and
received a warrant to arrest the defendant. 50 After entering the location
listed in the warrant—a room that was approximately ten feet wide by
twenty feet long—the agents placed the defendant under arrest and began
searching the room and seizing various papers.51 The agents opened all the
drawers of the two desks in the room, examined their contents, and seized
books, papers, and other items. 52 The agents also searched a towel cabinet
located in the room and seized papers from it as well.53 However, unlike in
Go-Bart, the desks and the cabinet were not locked when the agents opened
them. 54
The defendant in Lefkowitz moved to suppress the evidence seized
during the search. 55 The defendant’s motion to suppress was denied by the
district court, but the Second Circuit reversed, citing the Supreme Court’s
decision in Go-Bart. 56 In deciding whether the search was lawful under the
Fourth Amendment, the Court in Lefkowitz first noted that the defendant in
that case was lawfully arrested pursuant to an arrest warrant.57 The Court
also noted that, as in Go-Bart, the officers did not observe a crime being
The Court held that the agents “assumed the right
committed. 58
contemporaneously with the arrest to search out and scrutinize everything
in the room in order to ascertain whether the books, papers or other things
contained or constituted evidence of . . . [a] crime . . . . Their conduct was
unrestrained.” 59 The Court further held that a law enforcement agent’s
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59

Id. at 358.
Id.
285 U.S. 452, 458 (1932).
Id.
Id. at 458–59.
Id. at 459–60.
Id. at 460.
Id. at 460–61.
Id. at 461.
Id. at 462.
Id. at 462–63.
Id. at 463–64.
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authority to conduct a search incident to arrest “is not greater than that
conferred by a search warrant.” 60 The Court reasoned that the use of search
warrants was more likely to protect against unlawful searches “than by
reliance upon the caution and sagacity of petty officers while acting under
the excitement that attends the capture of persons accused of crime.” 61
The Court then went on to distinguish the facts of the case before it
from the facts present in Marron. The Court noted that, in Marron, the
officers observed a crime being committed in their presence, that the
arrestee was maintaining a nuisance in violation of federal law, that the
offense involved the element of continuity (consumption and sale of
alcohol), that the ledger and bills were in plain view when seized, and that
the ledger and bills were closely related to the offense being investigated. 62
The Court held that “[t]he facts disclosed in the [Marron] opinion were held
to justify the inference that when the arrest was made the ledger and bills
were in use to carry on the criminal enterprise.” 63
The Court in Lefkowitz held that, unlike the situation in Marron, the
facts of the case before it did not justify the search and seizure. 64 In
particular, the Court noted that “the searches were exploratory and general
and made solely to find evidence of respondents’ guilt of the alleged
conspiracy or some other crime,” 65 and that, “[t]hough intended to be used
to solicit orders for liquor in violation of the Act, the papers and other
articles found and taken were in themselves unoffending.” 66 The Court
noted that, in previous decisions, it had created a distinction between
searches to find evidence to convict an individual of a crime and searches to
find stolen goods or seize forfeited property, as well as searches conducted
“in order to prevent the commission of [a] crime.” 67 The Lefkowitz Court
concluded that the case before it did “not differ materially from the Go-Bart
case and is ruled by it. An arrest may not be used as a pretext to search for
evidence. The searches and seizures here challenged must be held violative
of respondents’ rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.” 68

60

Id. at 464.
Id.
62
Id. at 465.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 467.
65
Id. at 465.
66
Id.
67
Id. at 465–66 (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383, 395 (1914)).
68
Id. at 467.
61
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Go-Bart and Lefkowitz illustrate that, in the early 1930s, the Supreme
Court attempted to limit the scope of permissible police actions during a
search incident to a lawful arrest. 69 However, this limiting trend would not
continue indefinitely. For example, in Harris v. United States, 70 the Court
seemed to expand the authority given to police under the search incident to
arrest exception. 71 In Harris, federal agents obtained two warrants for the
defendant’s arrest, one for mail fraud and the other for sending a forged
check through interstate commerce. 72 FBI agents went to the defendant’s
apartment, placed him under arrest, put him in handcuffs, and then began to
search the entire apartment, which consisted of four rooms: a living room, a
bedroom, a bathroom, and a kitchen. 73 The stated reasons for the search
were to find two canceled checks that were “thought to have been used in
effecting the forgery” and to find “any means that might have been used to
commit” the crimes. 74 Over the defendant’s objections, the agents
conducted a thorough search of the entire apartment that lasted for
approximately five hours. 75 During the search, one of the agents discovered
in a bedroom bureau drawer a sealed envelope marked “George Harris,
personal papers.” 76 The agent tore open the envelope and found the
defendant’s altered Selective Service documents.77 After the district court
denied the defendant’s motion to suppress this evidence,78 the seized
documents were used to convict the defendant of violating the Selective
Service Act. 79 The Tenth Circuit affirmed the defendant’s conviction,
finding that “the search was carried on in good faith by the federal agents
for the purposes expressed, that it was not a general exploratory search for

69

See Kenneth M. Murchison, Prohibition and the Fourth Amendment: A New Look at
Some Old Cases, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 471, 501–02 (1982) (discussing how GoBart and Lefkowitz represented a break from Court’s Prohibition Era search incident to arrest
decisions).
70
331 U.S. 145 (1947).
71
See James J. Tomkovicz, Divining and Designing the Future of the Search Incident to
Arrest Doctrine: Avoiding Instability, Irrationality, and Infidelity, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 1417,
1424 (2007) (discussing history of search incident to arrest exception and noting that Harris
was an abrupt break from Court’s previous decisions).
72
Harris, 331 U.S. at 148.
73
Id. at 148.
74
Id. at 148–49.
75
Id. at 149.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id. at 146.
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merely evidentiary materials, and that the search and seizure were a
reasonable incident to petitioner’s arrest.” 80
The Court in Harris affirmed the defendant’s conviction, finding that
the search at issue was lawful as a search incident to arrest. 81 In support of
its conclusion, the Court appeared to expand the search incident to arrest
doctrine by leaps and bounds, holding that, not only were the police
permitted to search the room in which the defendant was arrested, but could
search his entire four-room apartment because, in the words of the Court,
“[h]is control extended quite as much to the bedroom in which the draft
cards were found as to the living room in which he was arrested.” 82
Because the evidence at issue could “easily have been concealed in any of
the four rooms of the apartment,” the police were permitted to conduct a
broad search. 83 Although the Court recognized that other cases might call
for more limited searches, it held that “the area which reasonably may be
subjected to search is not to be determined by the fortuitous circumstance
that the arrest took place in the living room as contrasted to some other
room of the apartment.” 84
The Court in Harris distinguished the facts of the case before it from
the facts present in Go-Bart, holding that Go-Bart involved a situation
where officers “entered premises ostensibly for the purpose of making an
arrest but in reality for the purpose of conducting a general exploratory
search for merely evidentiary materials tending to connect the accused with
some crime.” 85 By contrast, the Court noted that, in Harris, “the agents
were in possession of facts indicating petitioner’s probable guilt of the
crimes for which the warrants of arrest were issued. The search was not a
general exploration but was specifically directed to the means and
instrumentalities by which the crimes charged had been committed . . . .” 86
The Court concluded that “[t]he search which followed the arrest was
appropriate for the discovery of such objects. Nothing in the agents’
conduct was inconsistent with their declared purpose.” 87
Although the Supreme Court appeared ready and willing to
significantly expand the search incident to arrest exception in Harris, just

80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87

Id. at 150.
Id. at 155.
Id. at 152.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 153.
Id.
Id.
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one year later the pendulum swung once again, this time toward limiting the
exception. 88 Whereas the legality of the search in Harris was upheld by a
five to four vote, the search at issue in Trupiano v. United States 89 was
declared unconstitutional by the same margin. 90 The petitioners in
Trupiano built and operated an illegal distillery. 91 Unbeknownst to the
petitioners, federal agents were informed of their operation and one of the
agents went undercover as a farm hand, assisting the petitioners in building
the distillery. 92 Based on information provided by the undercover agent,
other federal agents traveled to the distillery one evening. 93 As they drove
onto the premises, the agents could smell fermenting mash and could hear
the distillery equipment. 94 As they approached the distillery, one of the
agents looked through an open door and could see the equipment. 95 The
agents then entered the building, placed the petitioners under arrest, and
“seized the illicit distillery.” 96 After the arrest, the agents conducted a
further search and found a large number of cans containing alcohol as well
as several vats containing fermenting mash. 97 The petitioners moved to
suppress the evidence seized by the agents, arguing that it was obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. 98 The district court denied the motion
to suppress and the Third Circuit affirmed. 99
In reversing the Third Circuit and holding that the search was
unlawful, the Court in Trupiano first noted that the agents engaged in the
raid “without securing a search warrant or warrants of arrest,”100 despite the
fact that “they had more than adequate opportunity to obtain such warrants
before the raid occurred . . . .” 101 The Court described the case as one
“where contraband property was seized by federal agents without a search
88

See Tomkovicz, supra note 71, at 1424 (discussing inconsistencies amongst search
incident to arrest decisions during this time period).
89
334 U.S. 699 (1948).
90
Id. at 709–10. Justice Douglas, who joined the majority in Harris, provided the fifth
(swing) vote in Trupiano. See J. Woodford Howard Jr., On the Fluidity of Judicial Choice,
62 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 43, 53 (1968).
91
Trupiano, 334 U.S. at 701.
92
Id.
93
Id. at 702.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Id. at 699.
99
Id. at 703.
100
Id.
101
Id.
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warrant under circumstances where such a warrant could easily have been
obtained.” 102 The Court held that, although the warrantless arrests were
valid because the arresting agents observed a felony being committed in
their presence, 103 the search was not lawful as an incident to those arrests. 104
The Court held that “[i]t is a cardinal rule that, in seizing goods and articles,
law enforcement agents must secure and use search warrants wherever
reasonably practicable.” 105 The Court noted that, in the case before it, the
agents knew “every detail of the construction and operation of the illegal
distillery long before the raid was made,” and that the undercover agent
“was in a position to supply information which could easily have formed
the basis for a detailed and effective search warrant.” 106 Further, the Court
held that “there was an abundance of time during which such a warrant
could have been secured, even on the night of the raid after the odor and
noise of the distillery confirmed their expectations.”107 The Court also
noted that “the property was not of a type that could have been dismantled
and removed before the agents had time to secure a warrant.”108
Discussing its search incident to arrest jurisprudence, the Court in
Trupiano held that the right to conduct a search incident to arrest was
“strictly limited” to cases where such a search was necessary. 109 Further,
such necessity could not come from the mere existence of a lawful arrest,
by itself. 110 Instead, the Court held, there had to “be some other factor in
the situation that would make it unreasonable or impracticable to require the
arresting officer to equip himself with a search warrant.”111 Applying this
legal standard to the facts before it, the Court held that “no reason whatever
has been shown why the arresting officers could not have armed themselves
during all the weeks of their surveillance of the locus with a duly obtained
search warrant—no reason, that is, except indifference to the legal process
for search and seizure which the Constitution contemplated.” 112

102

Id. at 703–04.
Id. at 704.
104
Id. at 705.
105
Id. (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156 (1925); Go-Bart Importing Co.
v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 358 (1931)).
106
Id. at 706.
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
Id. at 708.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id.
103

2011]

BARK WITH NO BITE

131

The Court in Trupiano then went on to distinguish the case before it
from Harris. The Court explained that, unlike Harris, the case before it
“relate[d] only to the seizure of contraband the existence and precise nature
and location of which the law enforcement officers were aware long before
making the lawful arrest.” 113 The Court held that “[this] circumstance was
wholly lacking in the Harris case, which was concerned with the
permissible scope of a general search without a warrant as an incident to a
lawful arrest.” 114 The Court went on to state that while “the Harris case
dealt with the seizure of Government property which could not have been
the subject of a prior search warrant, it having been found unexpectedly
during the course of a search,” the evidence seized in Trupiano “could
easily have been specified in a prior search warrant.”115 The Court
concluded that the factual differences between Harris and Trupiano were
“enough to justify confining ourselves to the precise facts of this case,
leaving it to another day to test the Harris situation by the rule that search
warrants are to be obtained and used wherever reasonably practicable.” 116
If Trupiano represented a major victory for civil libertarians, that
victory was short-lived. 117 Only two years later, in United States v.
Rabinowitz, the Supreme Court expressly overruled its holding in
Trupiano. 118 In Rabinowitz, federal agents obtained information that the
defendant was dealing in stamps with forged overprints.119 Based on this
information, the agents obtained a warrant for the defendant’s arrest. 120 At
the time they obtained the arrest warrant, the agents had reason to believe
that the defendant probably possessed several thousand altered stamps
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bearing forged overprints. 121 After obtaining the arrest warrant, the agents
went to the defendant’s one-room office and placed him under arrest.122
Over the defendant’s objection, the agents searched his desk, safe, and
filing cabinets for approximately an hour and a half.123 During their search,
the agents “found and seized 573 stamps, on which it was later determined
that overprints had been forged.” 124
The defendant was indicted on two counts: one for selling four forged
and altered stamps to an undercover agent, and the other for possessing,
with intent to defraud, the 573 forged and altered stamps that were found
during the search of his office. 125 He moved to suppress the evidence of the
stamps found during the search on Fourth Amendment grounds, but his
motion was denied by the district court. 126 After he was convicted on both
counts, the defendant appealed to the Second Circuit. Relying on the
Supreme Court’s decision in Trupiano, the Second Circuit reversed his
conviction on the ground that “since the officers had had time in which to
procure a search warrant and had failed to do so the search was illegal, and
the evidence therefore should have been excluded.”127
Undoubtedly to the surprise of many, the Court in Rabinowitz reversed
the Second Circuit and affirmed the defendant’s conviction.128 Discussing
the history of its search incident to arrest jurisprudence, the Court in
Rabinowitz noted that “[t]he right to search the person incident to arrest
always has been recognized in this country and in England. Where one had
been placed in the custody of the law by valid action of officers, it was not
unreasonable to search him.” 129 Finding that the arrest at issue was valid
due to the existence of an arrest warrant, the Court first concluded that the
defendant’s person was lawfully searched, and then considered whether the
search of his desk, safe, and filing cabinets was lawful as incident to his
arrest. 130 The Court noted that the defendant’s desk, safe, and filing
cabinets were “all within plain sight of the parties, and all located under
respondent’s immediate control in his one-room office open to the
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public[.]” 131 The Court cited its decision in Marron with approval, and held
that its subsequent decisions in Go-Bart and Lefkowitz did not drain Marron
of “contemporary vitality.” 132
Applying the law to the facts of the case before it, the Court in
Rabinowitz held that the search in question “was not general or
exploratory.” 133 Instead, the Court held, the officers had “probable cause to
believe that respondent was conducting his business illegally,” 134 and that
the forged stamps were “in the possession of and concealed by respondent
in the very room where he was arrested, over which room he had immediate
control and in which he had been selling such stamps unlawfully.” 135 The
Court went on to hold that such a limited search was authorized by
Harris. 136
After concluding that the search at issue was reasonable,137 the Court
finally addressed Trupiano, acknowledging that, in that case, the Court
“first enunciated the requirement that search warrants must be procured
when ‘practicable’ in a case of search incident to arrest.” 138 The Court held
that, although “[a] rule of thumb requiring that a search warrant always be
procured whenever practicable may be appealing from the vantage point of
easy administration,” it could not agree “that this requirement should be
crystallized into a sine qua non to the reasonableness of a search.” 139 The
Court went on to explain why the rule from Trupiano was unworkable:
It is fallacious to judge events retrospectively and thus to determine, considering the
time element alone, that there was time to procure a search warrant. Whether there
was time may well be dependent upon considerations other than the ticking off of
minutes or hours. The judgment of the officers as to when to close the trap on a
criminal committing a crime in their presence or who they have reasonable cause to
believe is committing a felony is not determined solely upon whether there was time
to procure a search warrant. Some flexibility will be accorded law officers engaged in
140
daily battle with criminals for whose restraint criminal laws are essential.

The Court concluded by overruling Trupiano insofar as it required “a search
warrant solely upon the basis of the practicability of procuring it rather than
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upon the reasonableness of the search after a lawful arrest.” 141 The Court
held that the important consideration was the reasonableness of the search,
not the reasonableness of procuring a search warrant. 142 To determine the
reasonableness of the search, “the total atmosphere of the case” had to be
examined. 143 As the Court would later note in Chimel v. California,
“Rabinowitz [came] to stand for the proposition . . . that a warrantless
search ‘incident to a lawful arrest’ may generally extend to the area that is
considered to be in the ‘possession’ or under the ‘control’ of the person
arrested.” 144
The next landmark case in the Court’s search incident to arrest
jurisprudence came in 1969, when the Court decided Chimel. 145 The
officers in Chimel, armed with a warrant authorizing the defendant’s arrest
for the burglary of a coin ship, arrived at the defendant’s home. 146 After
knocking on the front door and identifying themselves to the defendant’s
wife, they were allowed inside, where they waited approximately fifteen
minutes for the defendant to return home from work. 147 When the
defendant entered the house, one of the officers showed him the arrest
warrant and asked if the officers could look around. 148 Although the
defendant objected, the officers advised him that they would nevertheless
conduct a search “on the basis of the lawful arrest.” 149 The officers in
Chimel had not obtained a search warrant. 150
The officers conducted a search of the entire three-bedroom house,
including the attic, the garage, and a small workshop. 151 Although their
search of some rooms “was relatively cursory,” 152 while in the master
bedroom and the sewing room, “the officers directed the petitioner’s wife to
open drawers and ‘to physically move contents of the drawers from side to
side so that [they] might view any items that would have come from [the]

141
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burglary.’” 153 During the search, which lasted approximately forty-five
minutes to an hour, the officers seized various coins, medals, tokens, and
other objects. 154 At trial, the defendant objected to the admission of those
items into evidence, arguing that they had been unconstitutionally seized.155
The trial court rejected the defendant’s argument and admitted the
evidence. 156 The defendant was subsequently convicted of burglary, and
his conviction was affirmed by the state court of appeals and the state
supreme court. 157 Both courts held that, because the defendant’s arrest was
lawful, the subsequent search was also lawful as incident to that arrest.158
Assuming, without deciding, that the defendant’s arrest was valid, the
Supreme Court went directly to the question of whether the warrantless
search of the defendant’s house was justified as incident to that arrest. 159
The Court began with a discussion of the history of its search incident to
arrest jurisprudence, noting from the outset that “[t]he decisions of this
Court bearing upon that question have been far from consistent, as even the
most cursory review makes evident.” 160 After discussing the major cases
from Weeks to Rabinowitz, 161 the Court discussed the facts of the case
before it and concluded that the search at issue was violative of the Fourth
Amendment. 162
The Court in Chimel held that, to the extent that Rabinowitz stood for
the proposition “that a warrantless search ‘incident to a lawful arrest’ may
generally extend to the area that is considered to be in the ‘possession’ or
under the ‘control’ of the person arrested,” such a holding could withstand
“neither historical nor rational analysis.”163 The Chimel Court held that the
Rabinowitz decision was “hardly founded on an unimpeachable line of
authority” 164 and that it disregarded “the approach taken in cases such as
Go-Bart, Lefkowitz, and Trupiano.” 165 The Chimel Court further held that
the rationale by which the state sought to sustain the search at issue was not
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
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supported “by a reasoned view of the background and purpose of the Fourth
Amendment.” 166 It went on to discuss the utmost importance of the search
warrant and held that “[c]learly, the general requirement that a search
warrant be obtained is not lightly to be dispensed with, and ‘the burden is
on those seeking [an] exemption [from the requirement] to show the need
for it . . . .’” 167
Applying the same analysis utilized by the Court in Terry v. Ohio, 168
which was decided one year prior to Chimel, the Court held:
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person
arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to
resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer’s safety might well be
endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the
arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order
to prevent its concealment or destruction. And the area into which an arrestee might
reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items must, of course, be governed by a
like rule. A gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as
dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person
arrested. There is ample justification, therefore, for a search of the arrestee’s person
and the area “within his immediate control”—construing that phrase to mean the area
169
from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.

The Court then noted the lack of justification “for routinely searching any
room other than that in which the arrest occurs—or, for that matter, for
searching through all the desk drawers or other closed or concealed areas in
that room itself.” 170 The Court held that such searches required a search
warrant, absent the applicability of an exception to the warrant
requirement. 171
Moving on to Rabinowitz and Harris, the Court in Chimel held that the
result of those two decisions was “to give law enforcement officials the
opportunity to engage in searches not justified by probable cause, by the
simple expedient of arranging to arrest suspects at home rather than
elsewhere.” 172 After noting that “Rabinowitz and Harris ha[d] been the
subject of critical commentary for many years, and ha[d] been relied upon
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less and less in [the Court’s] own decisions,” 173 the Court overruled both of
those cases, holding that “insofar as the principles they stand for are
inconsistent with those that we have endorsed today, they are no longer to
be followed.” 174
Finally, turning to the facts of the case before it, the Court reversed the
defendant’s conviction, holding that that search in question “went far
beyond the petitioner’s person and the area from within which he might
have obtained either a weapon or something that could have been used as
evidence against him.” 175 Because it was conducted without a warrant, the
Court declared the search to be unreasonable.176
After Chimel, an officer, subsequent to an arrest, could search the
arrestee “in order to remove any weapons” that the arrestee might use to
resist arrest or escape, 177 and search for and seize any evidence on the
arrestee’s person or in the arrestee’s “grab area”—“the area from within
which [the arrestee] might gain possession of a weapon or destructible
evidence”—in order to prevent its concealment or destruction.178 However,
an officer was not permitted to conduct a routine search of “any room other
than that in which an arrest occurs,” or search “through all the desk drawers
or other closed or concealed areas in that room itself,” absent some other
exception to the warrant requirement. 179
Since laying out the general rule to be followed in search-incident-toarrest cases in Chimel, the Court has had many opportunities to clarify that
rule. In United States v. Robinson, for instance, the Court upheld an
officer’s full search of the defendant’s person after the defendant was
placed under arrest for driving on a revoked license. 180 The Court discussed
the two rationales behind allowing warrantless searches incident to arrest:
“The justification or reason for the authority to search incident to a lawful
arrest rests quite as much on the need to disarm the suspect in order to take
him into custody as it does on the need to preserve evidence on his person
for later use at trial.”181 Based on these “twin rationales,” the Court in
Robinson held that “[t]he standards traditionally governing a search incident
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to lawful arrest are not, therefore, commuted to the stricter Terry
standards 182 by the absence of probable fruits or further evidence of the
particular crime for which the arrest is made.”183 The Court then stated:
Nor are we inclined . . . to qualify the breadth of the general authority to search
incident to a lawful custodial arrest on an assumption that persons arrested for the
offense of driving while their licenses have been revoked are less likely to possess
dangerous weapons than are those arrested for other crimes. It is scarcely open to
doubt that the danger to an officer is far greater in the case of the extended exposure
which follows the taking of a suspect into custody and transporting him to the police
station than in the case of the relatively fleeting contact resulting from the typical
Terry-type stop. This is an adequate basis for treating all custodial arrests alike for
184
purposes of search justification.

Finally, the Court in Robinson took issue with the circuit court’s
suggestion that “there must be litigated in each case the issue of whether or
not there was present one of the reasons supporting the authority for a
search of the person incident to a lawful arrest.” 185 Rejecting this
suggestion, the Court noted the “ad hoc” nature of a police officer’s
determination of how and where to search a suspect and held that authority
for such a search “does not depend on what a court may later decide was the
probability in a particular arrest situation that weapons or evidence would in
fact be found upon the person of the suspect.” 186 The Court went on to hold
that “[i]t is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the authority to
search,” 187 and that such a search is inherently reasonable. 188
Since Chimel, the Court has also addressed the issue of the timing of a
search incident to arrest on several occasions. In Rawlings v. Kentucky, the
Court upheld a search incident to arrest that preceded the actual arrest,
holding that “[w]here the formal arrest followed quickly on the heels of the
challenged search of petitioner’s person, we do not believe it particularly

182
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important that the search preceded the arrest rather than vice versa.” 189
Further, in several cases, the Court has upheld delayed searches of the
arrestee or the things within the arrestee’s possession or control. In United
States v. Edwards, the Court upheld a search of the defendant’s possessions
that occurred while he was in custody at the city jail approximately ten
hours after his arrest. 190 The Court in Edwards held:
[O]nce the accused is lawfully arrested and is in custody, the effects in his possession
at the place of detention that were subject to search at the time and place of his arrest
may lawfully be searched and seized without a warrant even though a substantial
period of time has elapsed between the arrest and subsequent administrative
processing, on the one hand, and the taking of the property for use as evidence, on the
191
other.

As noted in more detail in the next two sections, since Chimel, the
authority of law enforcement officers to conduct warrantless searches
incident to arrest has expanded exponentially, with courts oftentimes losing
sight of the twin rationales that justify these searches in the first place—the
need to disarm the suspect and the need to preserve evidence.192
B. AUTOMOBILES AND THE SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST EXCEPTION

1. Origins: New York v. Belton.
Twelve years after Chimel was decided, the Court was asked to apply
the rationale of Chimel in the context of an automobile search. In New York
v. Belton, the Court addressed the following question: “When the occupant
of an automobile is subjected to a lawful custodial arrest, does the
constitutionally permissible scope of a search incident to his arrest include
the passenger compartment of the automobile in which he was riding?” 193
The Court answered that question in the affirmative.194
The defendant in Belton was one of four passengers in a vehicle pulled
over for speeding. 195 After the officer asked to see the driver’s license and

189
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at issue preceded any actual arrest, the officers did have probable cause to arrest the
defendant before conducting the search. Id. at 100–01.
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vehicle registration, he discovered that none of the men in the vehicle
owned the vehicle or were related to the vehicle’s owner.196 The officer
also smelled burnt marijuana and saw on the car’s floor an envelope marked
“Supergold,” which he knew was associated with marijuana. 197 The officer
directed the men to get out of the car and placed them under arrest for
possession of marijuana. 198 After patting down each of the men, the officer
split them up into four separate areas of the highway so that they would not
be next to each other.199 He then picked up the envelope and found
marijuana inside. 200 After reading the men their Miranda warnings, the
officer searched their persons and the passenger compartment of the
vehicle. 201 He found a jacket on the back seat of the vehicle belonging to
the defendant and, when he unzipped one of the jacket’s pockets, he found
cocaine. 202 The officer then placed the defendant’s jacket in his patrol car
and drove the four men to the police station.203
After being indicted for possession of a controlled substance, the
defendant moved to suppress the cocaine seized by the officer.204 The
district court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress and the defendant
pleaded guilty to a lesser included offense. 205 On appeal, the state appeals
court upheld the constitutionality of the search and seizure as a lawful
search incident to arrest.206 However, the state supreme court reversed,
holding that “[a] warrantless search of the zippered pockets of an
unaccessible jacket may not be upheld as a search incident to a lawful arrest
where there is no longer any danger that the arrestee or a confederate might
gain access to the article.” 207
The Court in Belton began with a discussion of its decision in Chimel,
which it interpreted as holding that “a lawful custodial arrest creates a
situation which justifies the contemporaneous search without a warrant of
the person arrested and of the immediately surrounding area.”208 The Court
196
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199
200
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then discussed the “twin rationales” of Chimel—to remove any weapons
from the arrestee and to prevent the concealment and destruction of
evidence. 209 In relation to those twin rationales, the Court had held that
“‘[the] scope of [a] search must be ‘strictly tied to and justified by’ the
circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible.’”210 The Court
then noted that “[a]lthough the principle that limits a search incident to a
lawful custodial arrest may be stated clearly enough, courts have discovered
the principle difficult to apply in specific cases.” 211
The Court then discussed the advantages of creating a bright-line rule
to govern police conduct. It noted that “‘[a] single familiar standard is
essential to guide police officers, who have only limited time and expertise
to reflect on and balance the social and individual interests involved in the
specific circumstances they confront.’” 212 The Court recognized that,
although bright-line rules had been created in other areas of search incident
to arrest jurisprudence, 213 no bright-line rule had yet been created in the
automobile context. 214 Pointing to the state of disarray that had been
created by federal circuit and state courts over the issue before it,215 the
Court warned that “[w]hen a person cannot know how a court will apply a
settled principle to a recurring factual situation, that person cannot know the
scope of his constitutional protection, nor can a policeman know the scope
of his authority.” 216
After discussing the need for a bright-line rule in the automobile
context, the Court in Belton held:
Our reading of the cases suggests the generalization that articles inside the relatively
narrow compass of the passenger compartment of an automobile are in fact generally,
even if not inevitably, within “the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to
grab a weapon or evidentiary ite[m].” In order to establish the workable rule this
category of cases requires, we read Chimel’s definition of the limits of the area that
may be searched in light of that generalization. Accordingly, we hold that when a
policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he
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may, as a contemporaneous incident to that arrest, search the passenger compartment
217
of that automobile.

The Court also held that officers could search any containers found in a
vehicle’s passenger compartment, regardless of whether such a container
was open or closed. 218 Importantly, the Court in Belton defined the word
“container” extremely broadly, as “any object capable of holding another
object. It thus includes closed or open glove compartments, consoles, or
other receptacles located anywhere within the passenger compartment, as
well as luggage, boxes, bags, clothing, and the like.” 219 The Court noted,
however, that its holding “encompasse[d] only the interior of the passenger
compartment of an automobile and d[id] not encompass the trunk.” 220
As if its holding was not broad enough already, and seemingly losing
sight of the twin rationales justifying searches incident to arrest laid out in
Chimel, the Court in Belton recognized “that these containers will
sometimes be such that they could hold neither a weapon nor evidence of
the criminal conduct for which the suspect was arrested.” 221 Despite this
acknowledgement, the Court held that such containers could nevertheless
be searched because the appropriateness of such a search could not depend
on a court’s subsequent hindsight determination of the probability that
weapons or evidence would be found. 222
In concluding that the search at issue was constitutionally valid, the
Court noted that the searched jacket was located in the passenger
compartment of the car in which the defendant had been a passenger just
before he was arrested. 223 Apparently not finding it relevant that, at the
time of the actual search, the defendant was nowhere near the vehicle’s
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passenger compartment, 224 the Court held that “[t]he jacket was thus within
the area which we have concluded was ‘within the arrestee’s immediate
control’ within the meaning of the Chimel case.” 225
The dissent in Belton, authored by Justice Brennan and joined by
Justice Marshall, criticized the majority’s opinion for ignoring the twin
rationales that justified searches incident to arrest in the first place, calling
the majority’s bright-line rule arbitrary. 226 Noting that the Chimel
exception was narrowly tailored to address the twin concerns discussed in
that case, 227 the dissenters stated that Chimel “places a temporal and a
spatial limitation on searches incident to arrest, excusing compliance with
the warrant requirement only when the search ‘is substantially
contemporaneous with the arrest and is confined to the immediate vicinity
of the arrest.’” 228 In a statement that would eventually become the law
nearly thirty years later, 229 Justice Brennan stated, “When the arrest has
been consummated and the arrestee safely taken into custody, the
justifications underlying Chimel’s limited exception to the warrant
requirement cease to apply: at that point there is no possibility that the
arrestee could reach weapons or contraband.” 230
Justice Brennan referred to the majority’s belief that the interior of a
car is always within the immediate control of an arrestee who had recently
been in that car as a fiction, 231 and stated that the majority “substantially
expands the permissible scope of searches incident to arrest by permitting
police officers to search areas and containers the arrestee could not possibly
reach at the time of arrest.” 232 In conclusion, Justice Brennan opined that
the majority was establishing a “dangerous precedent,” which was contrary
to Chimel and the Court’s other search-incident-to-arrest cases, as well as to
the doctrine of stare decisis and the Fourth Amendment itself. 233 In a
separate dissenting opinion, Justice White expressed his belief that, with
respect to a container located in an automobile, there exists a separate
224
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interest of privacy, and that, even when the police are justified in
conducting a search of the vehicle incident to arrest, they are not necessarily
also justified in searching containers found therein.234
After Belton, upon arresting the occupant of an automobile, a police
officer was permitted, incident to that arrest, to search the vehicle’s
passenger compartment. 235 An officer could also “examine the contents of
any containers found within the passenger compartment,” whether the
container was open or closed, including glove compartments, consoles,
luggage, boxes, bags, and clothing. 236 This was true even if the container in
question was “such that [it] could hold neither a weapon nor evidence of the
criminal conduct for which the suspect was arrested.” 237
2. Limiting Belton: Knowles v. Iowa
The Court’s decision in Belton dealt only with situations where a
custodial arrest was made. Seventeen years later, the Court was asked to
decide whether police could lawfully search a vehicle’s passenger
compartment when the driver is given a citation instead of being placed
under arrest. In Knowles v. Iowa, a police officer stopped the defendant for
speeding, but chose to issue him a citation rather than placing him under
arrest. 238 After issuing the citation, the officer conducted a full search of
the defendant’s car. 239 Under the driver’s seat, the officer found a bag of
marijuana and a pipe. 240 The defendant was arrested and charged with
possession of a controlled substance. 241
Before trial, Knowles moved to suppress the evidence obtained during
the search, arguing that the search could not be sustained under the search
incident to arrest exception because he had not actually been placed under
arrest. 242 The officer admitted at the suppression hearing that he had neither
the defendant’s consent nor probable cause to conduct the search.243 Based
on a state law that permitted an officer to conduct what the court referred to
as a “search incident to citation,” the trial court denied the defendant’s
234

Id. at 472 (White, J., dissenting).
Id. at 460.
236
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237
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motion to suppress and found him guilty. 244 The state supreme court
affirmed. 245
In a unanimous decision reversing the state supreme court and finding
that the search at issue was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment,
the Court in Knowles began by discussing the twin rationales of Chimel and
holding that neither rationale justified the search in question.246 Although
the Court recognized the legitimacy and importance of the first rationale—
officer safety 247—it went on to note that the threat associated with issuing a
traffic citation was not as great as the threat associated with an arrest. 248
The Court held that “while the concern for officer safety in this context may
justify the ‘minimal’ additional intrusion of ordering a driver and
passengers out of the car, it does not by itself justify the often considerably
greater intrusion attending a full field-type search.” 249
The Court in Knowles noted that, even without the search authority
urged by the state in the case before it, officers had other ways to protect
themselves: An officer could order individuals to exit a vehicle, conduct
pat-downs with reasonable suspicion, and conduct full searches pursuant to
an arrest. 250 As to the second justification behind the search incident to
arrest exception—the need to discover and preserve evidence—the Court in
Knowles concluded that the state had not shown the presence of this
concern either. 251 Specifically, the Court held that “[o]nce Knowles was
stopped for speeding and issued a citation, all the evidence necessary to
prosecute that offense had been obtained. No further evidence of excessive
speed was going to be found either on the person of the offender or in the
passenger compartment of the car.” 252
After Knowles, police officers were no longer permitted to conduct
searches incident to arrest when the suspect was issued a citation in lieu of
arrest. 253 Officers could still, however, order a vehicle’s occupants to exit
the vehicle and perform a Terry pat-down on those occupants if there
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existed reasonable suspicion that an occupant was dangerous and might
gain immediate control of a weapon.254
3. Expanding Belton: Thornton v. United States
If civil libertarians and defense attorneys criticized the Supreme
Court’s expansive holding in Belton, then they surely savaged the Court
when it expanded that holding even further twenty-three years later in
Thornton v. United States. 255 The Court in Thornton granted certiorari to
determine “whether Belton’s rule is limited to situations where the officer
makes contact with the occupant while the occupant is inside the vehicle, or
whether it applies as well when the officer first makes contact with the
arrestee after the latter has stepped out of his vehicle.”256 The Court
concluded that “Belton governs even when an officer does not make contact
until the person arrested has left the vehicle.”257
The defendant in Thornton was driving a vehicle when he came upon a
police car traveling in the same direction.258 The officer grew suspicious
when the defendant slowed down so as to avoid driving next to the
officer. 259 After running a check on the defendant’s license plates, the
officer learned that the tags had been issued to another vehicle. 260 After the
defendant drove into a parking lot, parked, and got out of the car, the officer
approached him and asked for his driver’s license. 261 Because the
defendant appeared nervous, and out of concern for his safety, the officer
conducted a pat-down search of the defendant’s person, to which the
defendant had consented. 262 That pat-down search resulted in the discovery
of both marijuana and cocaine on the defendant’s person.263 The officer
handcuffed the defendant, informed him that he was under arrest, and
placed him in the back seat of his patrol car. 264 The officer then conducted

254

Id. at 118.
541 U.S. 615 (2004); see Tomkovicz, supra note 71, at 1437 (discussing continuing
expansion of exception between Belton and Thornton).
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a search of the defendant’s vehicle and found a handgun under the driver’s
seat. 265
After being indicted on the charges of possession of cocaine,
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and possession of a firearm in
furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, the defendant moved to suppress the
evidence of the firearm as the fruit of an unconstitutional search.266 The
district court denied this motion, holding that the search was constitutional
pursuant to Belton and, alternatively, that the officer could have conducted
an inventory search. 267 After the defendant was convicted and sentenced to
180 months in prison, he appealed, arguing that Belton only applied where
the initial contact by the officer with the arrestee occurred while the arrestee
was still in the vehicle. 268 The Fourth Circuit rejected this argument and
held that the justifications for searches incident to arrest did not necessitate
such a limitation.269
Affirming the Fourth Circuit, the Court in Thornton began its analysis
by discussing the rules from Chimel and Belton. 270 The Court noted that, in
declaring the search at issue in Belton constitutional, the Court in that case
did not focus on the fact that the officer made contact with the suspects
while they were still in the vehicle.271 The Court continued:
Nor do we find such a factor persuasive in distinguishing the current situation, as it
bears no logical relationship to Belton’s rationale. There is simply no basis to
conclude that the span of the area generally within the arrestee’s immediate control is
determined by whether the arrestee exited the vehicle at the officer’s direction, or
whether the officer initiated contact with him while he remained in the car . . . .
In all relevant aspects, the arrest of a suspect who is next to a vehicle presents
identical concerns regarding officer safety and the destruction of evidence as the arrest
of one who is inside the vehicle . . . . The stress is no less merely because the arrestee
exited his car before the officer initiated contact, nor is an arrestee less likely to
attempt to lunge for a weapon or to destroy evidence if he is outside of, but still in
272
control of, the vehicle.

The Court in Thornton went on to note that “Belton allows police to
search the passenger compartment of a vehicle incident to a lawful custodial
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Id. at 619.
Id. (quoting United States v. Thornton, 325 F.3d 189, 195–96 (4th Cir. 2003)).
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arrest of both ‘occupants’ and ‘recent occupants.’” 273 The Court further
observed that:
Indeed, the respondent in Belton was not inside the car at the time of the arrest and
search; he was standing on the highway. In any event, while an arrestee’s status as a
“recent occupant” may turn on his temporal or spatial relationship to the car at the
time of the arrest and search, it certainly does not turn on whether he was inside or
274
outside the car at the moment that the officer first initiated contact with him.

Interestingly, the majority in Thornton expressly acknowledged a flaw
in its rationale: “To be sure, not all contraband in the passenger
compartment is likely to be readily accessible to a ‘recent occupant.’ It is
unlikely in this case that petitioner could have reached under the driver’s
seat for his gun once he was outside of his automobile.”275 However, the
Court held that a bright-line rule was nevertheless needed. 276 In conclusion,
the majority in Thornton set forth the following rule: “So long as an arrestee
is the sort of ‘recent occupant’ of a vehicle such as petitioner was here,
officers may search that vehicle incident to the arrest.”277
Justice Scalia filed a concurrence in Thornton, which was joined by
Justice Ginsburg. 278 In his concurrence, Justice Scalia opined that Belton
should not be expanded to include situations in which the arrestee was
handcuffed and secured in the back of a patrol car at the time of the
search. 279 He noted that “[t]he risk that [the defendant in this case] would
nevertheless ‘grab a weapon or evidentiary ite[m]’ from his car was remote
in the extreme,” 280 and that “[t]he Court’s effort to apply our current
doctrine to this search stretches it beyond its breaking point.” 281 In Justice
Scalia’s opinion, the search at issue instead could have been upheld as a
“more general sort of evidence-gathering search” permitted by cases like
Rabinowitz. 282 He cited a variety of cases that referred to “the general
interest in gathering evidence related to the crime of arrest with no mention
of the more specific interest in preventing its concealment or

273
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destruction.” 283 He concluded by stating that it was reasonable for the
officer in Thornton “to believe that further contraband or similar evidence
relevant to the crime for which [the defendant] had been arrested might be
found in the vehicle from which he had just alighted and which was still
within his vicinity at the time of arrest,” 284 and that the circuit court’s
decision should have been affirmed on this ground. 285 Justice Scalia also
opined that Belton should be limited to cases “where it is reasonable to
believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the
vehicle.” 286
Dissenting, Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Souter, stated that the
search at issue was not justified by Chimel or Belton. 287 According to
Justice Stevens, “Belton was demonstrably concerned only with the narrow
but common circumstance of a search occasioned by the arrest of a suspect
who was seated in or driving an automobile at the time the law enforcement
official approached.” 288 He continued by stating that “[t]he bright-line rule
crafted in Belton is not needed for cases in which the arrestee is first
accosted when he is a pedestrian, because Chimel itself provides all the
guidance that is necessary.” 289 He also pointed out some of the flaws in the
majority’s decision, including the majority’s failure to clarify exactly what
degree of temporal or special relationship with a vehicle would be required
to justify a search. 290 Justice Stevens noted that this lack of clarity would
lead to the subject of a search not knowing if or how he is protected by the
Constitution, and to a law enforcement officer not knowing the limits of his
authority. 291 Justice Stevens concluded by stating: “Without some limiting
principle, I fear that today’s decision will contribute to ‘a massive
broadening of the automobile exception,’ when officers have probable
cause to arrest an individual but not to search his car.” 292
After Thornton, an officer could conduct a vehicle search incident to
arrest even when the occupants exited the vehicle prior to the officer
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initiating contact.293 This rule applied regardless of the likelihood that the
vehicle’s recent occupants could reach for a weapon or contraband.294
4. The Effect of Belton and Thornton on Automobile Searches Incident to
Arrest
In the years following Belton and Thornton, the concerns expressed by
Justice Stevens in his dissenting opinion in Thornton seem to have come
true. In case after case, lower courts upheld searches conducted well after
the arrestee was placed under arrest, handcuffed, and secured. 295 In United
States v. Hrasky, for example, the Eighth Circuit upheld a search conducted
an hour after the arrestee was apprehended and after he had been
handcuffed and placed in the back of a patrol car.296 Similarly, in United
States v. Weaver, the Ninth Circuit upheld a search conducted ten to fifteen
minutes after the arrest was made, again after the arrestee had already been
handcuffed and secured in the back of a police vehicle.297 In support of this
holding, the Ninth Circuit stated:
Although contemporaneity is important, we have made clear that it is not the sole
inquiry. “The relevant distinction turns not upon the moment of arrest versus the
moment of the search but upon whether the arrest and search are so separated in time
or by intervening acts that the latter cannot be said to have been incident to the
former.” Indeed, “[t]here is no fixed outer limit for the number of minutes that may
pass between an arrest and a valid, warrantless search that is a contemporaneous
298
incident of the arrest.”

Although the Ninth Circuit suggested that the Supreme Court should
re-examine its holding in Belton because “the Belton rule [was] broader
than its stated rationale,” 299 it nevertheless felt compelled to uphold the
search at issue pursuant to Belton and its progeny. 300 Moreover, in dozens
of other cases, courts upheld searches incident to arrest that were conducted
after the arrestee was already handcuffed and secured in a patrol car. 301 A
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few years later, however, the Supreme Court followed the Ninth Circuit’s
advice and revisited its holding in Belton.
III. REINING IT IN: ARIZONA V. GANT
Just when one might have thought that a police officer’s authority to
search an automobile incident to a custodial arrest had no limits, the
Supreme Court issued its decision in Arizona v. Gant. 302 Based on an
anonymous tip that drugs were being sold from a particular residence, the
officers in Gant traveled to that residence and encountered the defendant as
he drove his car into the driveway. 303 Based on a previous encounter with
the defendant earlier that day, the officers knew that the defendant’s license
had been suspended and that there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest
for driving with a suspended license. 304 After the officers confirmed that
the driver of the car was the defendant by shining a flashlight into the car as
it drove by, the defendant parked at the end of the driveway, got out of his
car, and shut the door. 305 One of the officers called to the defendant and
after they approached each other, the officer immediately placed the
defendant under arrest and handcuffed him. 306 After additional officers
arrived on the scene, the defendant was placed in the back seat of a patrol
car. 307
After the defendant had been handcuffed and placed in the back of a
patrol car, the officers searched his vehicle, finding a gun and a bag of
cocaine. 308 The bag of cocaine was found in the pocket of a jacket located
in the back seat. 309 After being charged with two drug offenses, the
defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized from his car on Fourth
Amendment grounds. 310 The defendant argued that the search was not
authorized by Belton “because he posed no threat to the officers after he
was handcuffed in the patrol car and because he was arrested for a traffic
offense for which no evidence could be found in his vehicle.” 311 The trial
court denied the motion to suppress, concluding that the search was
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permissible as a search incident to arrest. 312 The defendant was found
guilty by a jury and sentenced to three years in prison. 313
On appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court reversed the trial court,
concluding that the search conducted was unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. 314 The Arizona Supreme Court discussed Belton, but
distinguished Belton from the case before it.315 The court held that the
analysis in Belton did not apply where, as in the case at bar, the search
occurred after the scene was secure.316 Citing Chimel’s twin rationales, the
Arizona Supreme Court held:
[W]hen . . . the justifications underlying Chimel no longer exist because the scene is
secure and the arrestee is handcuffed, secured in the back of a patrol car, and under
the supervision of an officer, the warrantless search of the arrestee’s car cannot be
justified as necessary to protect the officers at the scene or prevent the destruction of
317
evidence.

The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the
state supreme court by a margin of five to four. The majority opinion was
authored by Justice Stevens, who was joined by Justices Scalia, Souter,
Thomas, and Ginsburg. Justice Scalia also filed a concurring opinion. Two
dissenting opinions were filed: one by Justice Breyer and another by Justice
Alito, the latter of which was joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice
Kennedy and, in part, by Justice Breyer. The majority in Gant began its
discussion by noting that “[t]he chorus that has called for us to revisit
Belton includes courts, scholars, and Members of this Court who have
questioned that decision’s clarity and its fidelity to Fourth Amendment
principles.” 318 The Court then went through a history of its search incident
to arrest jurisprudence, including its decisions in Chimel and Belton. 319
Citing the Arizona Supreme Court’s interpretation of its holding in
Belton, the Court in Gant stated:
The Arizona Supreme Court read our decision in Belton as merely delineating “the
proper scope of a search of the interior of an automobile” incident to an arrest. That
is, when the passenger compartment is within an arrestee’s reaching distance, Belton

312
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Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1716.
Id. at 1716–18.

2011]

BARK WITH NO BITE

153

supplies the generalization that the entire compartment and any containers therein
320
may be reached.

The Court continued:
Despite the textual and evidentiary support for the Arizona Supreme Court’s reading
of Belton, our opinion has been widely understood to allow a vehicle search incident
to the arrest of a recent occupant even if there is no possibility the arrestee could gain
321
access to the vehicle at the time of the search.

Discussing the effects of Belton, the Court in Gant echoed the
concerns expressed by Justice O’Connor in her Thornton concurrence—that
“lower court decisions seem now to treat the ability to search a vehicle
incident to the arrest of a recent occupant as a police entitlement rather than
as an exception justified by the twin rationales of Chimel.” 322
The Court went on to criticize the prevailing interpretation of its
decision in Belton:
Under this broad reading of Belton, a vehicle search would be authorized incident to
every arrest of a recent occupant notwithstanding that in most cases the vehicle’s
passenger compartment will not be within the arrestee’s reach at the time of the
search. To read Belton as authorizing a vehicle search incident to every recent
occupant’s arrest would thus untether the rule from the justifications underlying the
Chimel exception—a result clearly incompatible with our statement in Belton that it
“in no way alters the fundamental principles established in the Chimel case regarding
323
the basic scope of searches incident to lawful custodial arrests.”

The Court expressly rejected this broad interpretation of Belton and
held that “the Chimel rationale authorizes police to search a vehicle incident
to a recent occupant’s arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and within
reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the
search.” 324 In a footnote, the Court noted that “[b]ecause officers have
many means of ensuring the safe arrest of vehicle occupants, it will be the
rare case in which an officer is unable to fully effectuate an arrest so that a
real possibility of access to the arrestee’s vehicle remains.” 325 Next, the
Court held that “circumstances unique to the vehicle context justify a search
incident to a lawful arrest when it is ‘reasonable to believe evidence
relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.’”326 The Court
noted that, “[i]n many cases, as when a recent occupant is arrested for a
320
321
322
323
324
325
326

Id. at 1718 (citation omitted).
Id.
Id. (citing Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 624 (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
Id. at 1719 (internal citations omitted).
Id.
Id. at 1719 n.4.
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traffic violation, there will be no reasonable basis to believe the vehicle
contains relevant evidence.” 327 “But in others,” the Court continued,
“including Belton and Thornton, the offense of arrest will supply a basis for
searching the passenger compartment of an arrestee’s vehicle and any
containers therein.” 328
Turning to the facts of the case before it, the Court in Gant held that
“[n]either the possibility of access nor the likelihood of discovering
offense-related evidence authorized the search in this case.” 329 The Court
explained that Gant “clearly was not within reaching distance of his car at
the time of the search,” 330 and that the offense for which Gant was
arrested—driving with a suspended license—was “an offense for which
police could not expect to find evidence in the passenger compartment of
Gant’s car.” 331 The Court found that, “[b]ecause police could not
reasonably have believed either that Gant could have accessed his car at the
time of the search or that evidence of the offense for which he was arrested
might have been found therein, the search in this case was unreasonable.”332
The Court in Gant rejected the state’s argument that Belton searches
were reasonable regardless of the possibility of access, holding that the state
“seriously undervalue[d] the privacy interests at stake,” 333 and
“exaggerate[d] the clarity that its reading of Belton provides.” 334 The Court
held that, contrary to the state’s suggestion, “a broad reading of Belton is
also unnecessary to protect law enforcement safety and evidentiary
interests.” 335 The Court explained:
Under our view, Belton and Thornton permit an officer to conduct a vehicle search
when an arrestee is within reaching distance of the vehicle or it is reasonable to
believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest. Other established
exceptions to the warrant requirement authorize a vehicle search under additional
circumstances when safety or evidentiary concerns demand . . . .
These exceptions together ensure that officers may search a vehicle when genuine
safety or evidentiary concerns encountered during the arrest of a vehicle’s recent
336
occupant justify a search.
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Finally, the Court responded to the dissenters’ accusation that the
majority was ignoring the doctrine of stare decisis. 337 Although it
recognized the importance of stare decisis, the majority held that it could
not rely on the doctrine “to justify the continuance of an unconstitutional
police practice,”338 and that it “would be particularly loath to uphold an
unconstitutional result in a case that is so easily distinguished from the
decisions that arguably compel it.” 339 The majority also rejected the
dissenters’ argument that “consideration of police reliance interests
require[d] a different result,” 340 holding that “[i]f it is clear that a practice is
unlawful, individuals’ interest in its discontinuance clearly outweighs any
law enforcement ‘entitlement’ to its persistence.” 341
Concurring, Justice Scalia focused on “traditional standards of
reasonableness,” 342 and stated that “those standards do not justify what I
take to be the rule set forth in [Belton] and [Thornton]: that arresting
officers may always search an arrestee’s vehicle in order to protect
themselves from hidden weapons.” 343 Justice Scalia went on to state:
When an arrest is made in connection with a roadside stop, police virtually always
have a less intrusive and more effective means of ensuring their safety—and a means
that is virtually always employed: ordering the arrestee away from the vehicle, patting
344
him down in the open, handcuffing him, and placing him in the squad car.

Although Justice Scalia recognized that police officers face a risk of
being shot whenever they initiate a traffic stop, he went on to note that the
risk “is not at all reduced by allowing a search of the stopped vehicle after
the driver has been arrested and placed in the squad car.” 345 Justice Scalia
noted that the state had “failed to provide a single instance in which a
formerly restrained arrestee escaped to retrieve a weapon from his own
vehicle.” 346
Despite agreeing with the majority’s outcome, however, Justice Scalia
disagreed with its reasoning. Specifically, he stated that Belton and
Thornton should be overruled and that a new rule should be established
under which “a vehicle search incident to arrest is ipso facto ‘reasonable’
337
338
339
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only when the object of the search is evidence of the crime for which the
arrest was made, or of another crime that the officer has probable cause to
believe occurred.” 347 Justice Scalia explained that, under his proposed rule,
the search at issue in Gant would be deemed unlawful.348 As to the
dissenters’ stare decisis argument, Justice Scalia stated that there was
“ample reason” for abandoning prior precedent in this context: “the
precedent was badly reasoned and produces erroneous (in this case
unconstitutional) results.” 349
Dissenting, Justice Breyer stated that the Court’s holding in Belton was
“best read as setting forth a bright-line rule that permits a warrantless search
of the passenger compartment of an automobile incident to the lawful arrest
of an occupant—regardless of the danger the arrested individual in fact
poses.” 350 Because of his belief that “the rule c[ould] produce results
divorced from its underlying Fourth Amendment rationale,”351 Justice
Breyer stated that he “would look for a better rule—were the question
before us one of first impression.” 352 However, he went on to state that the
question was not one of first impression “and that fact makes a substantial
difference.” 353 Based on the doctrine of stare decisis, Justice Breyer
expressed his unwillingness to abandon a well-established legal precedent
that had been relied upon considerably by other courts.354
Justice Alito’s separate dissent, joined by Chief Justice Roberts,
Justice Kennedy, and in part by Justice Breyer, expressed concern that the
majority’s holding might “endanger arresting officers,”355 “confuse law
enforcement officers and judges for some time to come,” 356 and “cause the
suppression of evidence gathered in many searches carried out in good-faith
reliance on well-settled case law.” 357 Justice Alito criticized the majority’s
attempt at narrowing the holding of Belton, and stated that Belton stood for
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the broader proposition that arresting officers “may always search an
arrestee’s vehicle in order to protect themselves.”358
IV. GANT’S AFTERMATH AND INEVITABLE DISCOVERY
Pursuant to the majority’s holding in Gant, a police officer may search
a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest in only two situations: (1) “if
the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the
time of the search”; 359 or (2) if “it is reasonable to believe the vehicle
contains evidence of the offense of arrest.” 360 The first category excludes
any arrestee who is handcuffed or otherwise secured or outside of reaching
distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search.361 As the
Court itself noted in Gant, “[b]ecause officers have many means of
ensuring the safe arrest of vehicle occupants,” it will be the rare situation
where this is not the case. 362 Therefore, in practical effect, Gant limits
lawful searches incident to arrest to the second category, which excludes
arrests for traffic violations or other offenses for which evidence would not
reasonably be found in the vehicle.363
In theory, the Court’s holding in Gant represents a landmark in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. After twenty-eight years of expanding police
authority in the context of automobile searches incident to arrest, the Court
finally placed a significant limitation on the scope of permissible police
activity. And the Court did so out of concern over and respect for the
important constitutional interests that a motorist has in his vehicle.364
358

Id. at 1727. Justice Alito also criticized the majority for abandoning Belton’s brightline rule, and stated that the majority could not justify its departure from the normal rule of
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as open containers of alcohol, drugs, or drug paraphernalia. See Eric H. Sills & Erin H.
Gerstenzang, Column: DWI, CHAMPION MAG., December 2009, at *56. On the other hand,
because possession is not an element of driving under the influence, it could be argued that
such evidence, even if found, would not be “evidence of the offense of arrest.” The author
could not find any cases discussing Gant’s effect on DUI arrests. As this is not the focus of
this Article, it is enough to raise the issue without further analysis.
364
Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1720.
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However, in the months following the Court’s decision in Gant, it became
clear that the Court’s landmark decision left something to be desired in
terms of practical real-world effect. This is because in order to avoid
exclusion of evidence based on the Court’s holding in Gant, it is often only
necessary for the government or police to characterize the search, post hoc,
as an inventory search rather than a search incident to arrest, or to argue that
the tainted evidence should not be excluded because it inevitably would
have been discovered during a later inventory search.
In South Dakota v. Opperman, the Supreme Court held that, as long as
certain safeguards are met, the police may, consistent with the Fourth
Amendment, conduct a warrantless search of an arrestee’s vehicle as part of
the impoundment procedure. 365 In order for an inventory search to be
lawful, the subject vehicle “must first be in the lawful custody of the
police,” and the “search must be conducted pursuant to standardized police
procedures.” 366 The Court has stated that inventory searches “serve to
protect an owner’s property while it is in the custody of the police, to insure
against claims of lost, stolen, or vandalized property, and to guard police
from danger.” 367 Based on these legitimate interests, the Court has
“accorded deference to police caretaking procedures designed to secure and
protect vehicles and their contents within police custody.” 368 Because of
the nature of the very specific interests justifying inventory searches,
however, courts have held that the purpose of an inventory search “must be
to identify and secure personal property inside the vehicle and not to gather
incriminating evidence against the vehicle’s occupants.” 369
After Opperman was decided, several lower federal and state courts
attempted to limit the authority of police to conduct inventory searches. For
instance, the Supreme Court of Colorado once deemed an inventory search
unlawful where the arrestee could have made alternative arrangements for
the safekeeping of his property. 370 Reversing the Supreme Court of
Colorado, however, the United States Supreme Court noted that “[t]he
reasonableness of any particular governmental activity does not necessarily

365

428 U.S. 364, 374–75 (1976).
United States v. Battle, No. 09-4169, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 5427, at *7 (4th Cir.
Mar. 16, 2010).
367
Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1987).
368
Id.
369
Battle, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 5427, at *7. For a more detailed history of the
inventory search exception to the warrant requirement, see Steven M. Christenson, Colorado
v. Bertine Opens the Inventory Search to Containers, 73 IOWA L. REV. 771 (1998).
370
People v. Bertine, 706 P.2d 411, 418 (Colo. 1985), rev’d, 479 U.S. 367 (1987).
366
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or invariably turn on the existence of alternative ‘less intrusive’ means.” 371
The Court held that “reasonable police regulations relating to inventory
procedures administered in good faith satisfy the Fourth Amendment, even
though courts might as a matter of hindsight be able to devise equally
reasonable rules requiring a different procedure.” 372
Although the Court has repeatedly held that, in order to be lawful, an
inventory search must “be conducted according to standardized criteria,” 373
this does not mean that an officer cannot be given discretion to choose
between several reasonable alternatives. In Bertine, the petitioner argued
that the inventory search of his vehicle was unconstitutional because
“departmental regulations gave the police officers discretion to choose
between impounding his van and parking and locking it in a public parking
place.” 374 The Court rejected this argument, holding that “[n]othing in
Opperman . . . prohibits the exercise of police discretion so long as that
discretion is exercised according to standard criteria and on the basis of
something other than suspicion of criminal activity.”375 In terms of scope,
inventory searches are similar to the searches incident to arrest that were
permitted under Belton. Not only can police search the passenger
compartment of the impounded vehicle but, so long as department policy
allows it, they may also search any containers located within the vehicle,
whether open or closed. 376 Police may also search a locked trunk during an
inventory search. 377
The Court’s holding in Gant, while severely limiting searches incident
to arrest, did nothing to affect the availability or scope of inventory
searches. If the subject vehicle is in the lawful custody of the police, and
the search is conducted pursuant to standardized police procedures, police
may conduct a search of the vehicle’s passenger compartment, trunk, and
any containers located therein, whether open or closed, as part of their
impoundment procedures. Post-Gant, even if a police officer conducts a
search that is not authorized as a search incident to arrest, the prosecution

371

Bertine, 479 U.S. at 374 (quoting Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647 (1983)).
Id.
373
Id. at 374 n.6.
374
Id. at 375.
375
Id.
376
Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990); see Christenson, supra note 369, at 783.
377
United States v. Wright, No. 4:08-cr-18, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19676, at *16 (E.D.
Tenn. Feb. 5, 2010) (citing United States v. Jemison, 310 F. App’x 866, 871 (6th Cir. 2009));
see also United States v. Long, 705 F.2d 1259, 1262 (10th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Bosby, 675 F.2d 1174, 1179 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Edwards, 577 F.2d 883, 893
(5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied 439 U.S. 968 (1978).
372
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can argue that the evidence found during such a search inevitably would
have been discovered during a later inventory search and, therefore, should
not be suppressed. 378 Provided the prosecution can establish this by a
preponderance of the evidence, the tainted evidence will be admissible
notwithstanding its illegality under Gant. 379
In many recent cases, lower courts have avoided application of Gant
either by characterizing the search at issue as an inventory search rather
than a search incident to arrest, or by holding that the evidence inevitably
would have been discovered during a later inventory search. 380 The former
approach was taken by the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Sand. 381 In
Sand, there was a question as to whether the search at issue was a search
incident to arrest or an inventory search. 382 Although the search was
characterized as a search incident to arrest in some places in the record, in
concluding that the search was a permissible inventory search, the court in
Sand focused on the fact that the officer who conducted the search testified
that it was an inventory search and that the vehicle was being prepared for
towing. 383 The court acknowledged that, had the search been a search
incident to arrest as opposed to an inventory search, it may have been illegal
under Gant. 384
The latter approach—using the inevitable discovery rule to save
evidence discovered during a search that is otherwise illegal under Gant—

378

In Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984) [hereinafter Williams II], the Court
established the inevitable discovery rule, holding that “[i]f the prosecution can establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been
discovered by lawful means,” then the evidence should not be excluded. The Court in
Williams II rejected a rule that would have required the prosecution to prove the absence of
bad faith by the police. Id. at 445.
379
Id. at 444. The reason this did not work to save the evidence in Gant itself is because,
in Gant, the officers “had no intention of impounding Gant’s car until after they searched the
passenger compartment and found the contraband.” State v. Gant, 162 P.3d 640, 646 (Ariz.
2007).
380
See infra notes 384–389 and accompanying text.
381
329 F. App’x 794 (10th Cir. 2009).
382
Id. at 798 n.1.
383
Id. at 798.
384
Id.; see also United States v. Allen, No. 4:08-cr-40, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95383, at
*4–6 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 13, 2009) (upholding search of vehicle as lawful inventory search
unaffected by Gant); United States v. McCullum, No. 3:07-cr-128, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
93377, at *5 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 5, 2009) (same); United States v. Gilbert, No. 2:08-cr-0094,
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56826, at *23 n.6 (W.D. Pa. July 2, 2009) (same); United States v.
Elliot, No. 09cr0082, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40222, at *5–6 (S.D. Cal. May 8, 2009)
(declining to reach the Gant issue because search was lawful inventory search).
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was utilized by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Ruckes.385 The court in
Ruckes found that the search at issue did not meet the requirements of a
search incident to arrest under Gant. 386 However, the court affirmed the
defendant’s conviction because the evidence seized “would have been
uncovered during a routine inventory search of the vehicle upon
impound.” 387 Although the court in Ruckes applied the inevitable discovery
rule to save the evidence seized in that case, it noted that “the inevitable
discovery doctrine will not always save a search that has been invalidated
under Gant. The government is still required to prove, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that there was a lawful alternative justification for
discovering the evidence.” 388 A simple Sherpardizing of Gant reveals that
there is an abundance of other cases in which courts have reached the same
result. 389

385

586 F.3d 713 (9th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 715.
387
Id.
388
Id. at 719. In a subsequent case, United States v. Avendano, No. 08-50505, 2010 U.S.
App. LEXIS 6836, at *4–5 (9th Cir. Apr. 1, 2010), the Ninth Circuit cited this language from
Ruckes and held that, in the case before it, the Government could not rely on the inevitable
discovery rule to save a search made unlawful by Gant where the Government “failed to
meet its burden of proving standardized local procedure and compliance with that
procedure.” Id. at *4; see also United States v. Chavez, No. 2:09-cr-0033, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 116924, at *19-21 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2009) (same).
389
United States v. Stotler, 591 F.3d 935, 940 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding that, even if
search was unlawful under Gant, evidence was admissible because it would have inevitably
been discovered during later inventory search); Davis v. Smith, No. 3:09CV274, 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 5163, at *13–14 (E.D. Va. Jan. 22, 2010) (applying same reasoning in civil case
for unlawful arrest and false imprisonment); United States v. Bradford, No. 09-CR-71, 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110385, at *11 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 5, 2009) (“[E]ven if the search of the car
exceeded the bounds set by Gant, the government demonstrated that the gun would
inevitably have been discovered pursuant to the inventory search.”); United States v.
Morillo, No. 08 CR 676, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94396, at *6–7, 23 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2009)
(despite violation of Gant, evidence was admissible because it would have inevitably been
discovered during inventory search); United States v. Maxwell, No. 4:09CR299, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 77454, at *7–8 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 31, 2009) (holding that search was permissible
under Gant and, alternatively, that evidence would have inevitably been discovered during
inventory search); United States v. Owen, No. 1:09cr38HSO, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85929,
at *11–12 (S.D. Miss. August 28, 2009) (same); Humphreys v. State, No. S09P1428, 2010
Ga. LEXIS 227, at *32–33 (Ga. Mar. 15, 2010) (“We need not determine whether the search
of the [vehicle] after [the defendant]’s arrest was valid under Gant, however, because it is
apparent that the evidence seized from the vehicle would have been discovered during the
subsequent inventory of the vehicle and that it was therefore admissible under the inevitable
discovery rule.”); People v. Reyes, No. B214107, 2009 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 9935, at
*15 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2009) (Mosk, J., concurring) (discussing possible application of
inevitable discovery rule in Gant context).
386
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The Court’s holding in Gant, while a good first step towards ensuring
Fourth Amendment protection in the automobile search context, does not go
far enough to protect a motorist’s privacy interest in his vehicle, an interest
that the Court in Gant specifically recognized as important.390 In order to
give its holding in Gant some teeth, the Court will need to follow up with
decisions limiting either the inventory search exception to the warrant
requirement, or the inevitable discovery rule. The former option—that of
limiting the inventory search exception—seems highly unlikely given the
Court’s prior decisions regarding that exception to the warrant requirement
and the legitimate interests served by allowing inventory searches.391 The
latter option then—limiting the inevitable discovery rule—appears to be the
only realistic way in which the loophole around the holding in Gant
eventually might be closed.
There are several ways in which the Court reasonably could limit the
inevitable discovery rule, each finding support under the laws of various
states. The first option would be to make a distinction between “primary”
and “secondary” evidence and to hold that the inevitable discovery rule
applies to save the latter from exclusion, but not the former. 392 This would
limit the rule by only allowing evidence completely untainted by the illegal
search while recognizing the deterrence rationale behind the exclusionary
rule. One of the leading jurisdictions to follow this approach is New York.
In People v. Stith,393 officers initiated a stop of the defendants’ truck tractor
for speeding. 394 When the defendants could not locate the truck’s
registration, one of the officers ordered them out of the truck and climbed
into the driver’s side of the truck to conduct his own search. 395 After
removing a portfolio sticking out of a bag, the officer noticed the butt of a
revolver inside the bag’s side pocket.396 The defendants were arrested for
criminal possession of a weapon and transported to the local jail.397 On the

390

Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1720 (2009) (“Although we have recognized that a
motorist’s privacy interest in his vehicle is less substantial than in his home . . . the former
interest is nevertheless important and deserving of constitutional protections.”).
391
See supra notes 365–377 and accompanying text.
392
For a detailed argument of why the inevitable discovery rule should be applied only to
secondary, and not primary, evidence, see Jessica Forbes, The Inevitable Discovery
Exception, Primary Evidence, and the Emasculation of the Fourth Amendment, 55 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1221 (1987).
393
506 N.E.2d 911 (N.Y. 1987).
394
Id. at 912.
395
Id.
396
Id.
397
Id.
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way to the jail, the officers learned that the defendant’s license had expired
and that the truck was stolen. 398 The defendants were then charged with
criminal possession of stolen property. 399
Prior to trial, the defendants moved to suppress the gun found during
the search, but the trial court denied the motion. 400 On appeal, the appellate
division affirmed this denial. 401 Both of those courts held that, even though
the search and seizure were in violation of the defendants’ constitutional
rights, the evidence should not be excluded pursuant to the inevitable
discovery rule because the gun inevitably would have been discovered
during an inventory search following the defendants’ arrest when the police
learned that the truck was stolen.402
On appeal, the Court of Appeals of New York reversed, concluding
that application of the inevitable discovery rule was not proper in that
case. 403 The court held that, while New York courts had recognized the
inevitable discovery rule for several years, the courts had “never applied the
rule where, as here, the evidence sought to be suppressed is the very
evidence obtained in the illegal search.”404 The court noted that in all of the
cases in which the inevitable discovery rule had been applied, “the evidence
saved from suppression by the inevitable discovery rule was not evidence
illegally obtained during or as the immediate consequence of the challenged
police conduct,” 405 but instead was “evidence obtained indirectly as a result
of leads or information gained from that primary evidence.”406
Interestingly, not only did the court in Stith cite other New York court
decisions to support this proposition, but it also cited the United States
Supreme Court’s decision in Williams II, noting that the evidence saved
from suppression in that case was secondary, rather than primary,
evidence. 407
In support of its holding that the inevitable discovery rule should apply
only to secondary evidence, the court in Stith noted that:

398
399
400
401
402
403
404
405
406
407

Id. at 912–13.
Id. at 913.
Id. at 912.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 913–14.
Id. at 914.
Id.
Id.
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When the inevitable discovery rule is applied to secondary evidence . . . the effect is
not to excuse the unlawful police actions by admitting what was obtained as a direct
result of the initial misconduct. It is not the tainted evidence that is admitted, but only
what comes from it as a result of further police investigation. The rationale is that
when the secondary evidence would have been found independently in any event, “the
prosecution [should not be] put in a worse position simply because of some earlier
408
police error or misconduct.

The court went on to hold that the same reasoning did not apply when
it came to the admission of primary evidence:
In contrast, when the inevitable discovery rule is applied to primary evidence, as was
done here, the result is quite different. It is the tainted evidence itself and not the
product of that evidence which is saved from exclusion. Permitting its admission in
evidence effects what amounts to an after-the-fact purging of the initial wrongful
conduct, and it can never be claimed that a lapse of time or the occurrence of
intervening events has attenuated the connection between the evidence ultimate
acquired and the initial misconduct. The illegal conduct and the seizure of the
409
evidence are one and the same.

The court concluded that application of the inevitable discovery rule to
save primary evidence from suppression “would be an unacceptable
dilution of the exclusionary rule,” because it would “defeat a primary
purpose of that rule, deterrence of police misconduct.”410
The New York approach as established by Stith has been utilized by
New York courts post-Gant to reject application of the inevitable discovery
rule where a search incident to arrest violates the holding of Gant. In
People v. Derrell, 411 for instance, the court found that the search at issue
was illegal under Gant and then rejected the Government’s argument that
the inevitable discovery rule should apply. 412 Citing Stith, the court in
Derrell held that the inevitable discovery rule did not apply in the case
before it because the evidence sought to be suppressed was primary, as
opposed to secondary, evidence. 413 Courts in Oregon and Pennsylvania
have also applied the primary–secondary evidence distinction applied by
the New York courts. 414 The distinction has been rejected by the courts of
several other states. 415
408

Id. (quoting Williams II, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984)).
Id.
410
Id.
411
889 N.Y.S.2d 905 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009).
412
Id. at 920.
413
Id. at 920–21.
414
State v. Crossen, 536 P.2d 1263, 1264 (Or. Ct. App. 1975) (“The inevitable discovery
rule has been applied only to purge the taint from derivative, not primary, evidence and we
see no reason in this case to extend it to the latter.”); Commonwealth v. Guillespie, 745 A.2d
409
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Although the United States Supreme Court has never recognized this
primary–secondary evidence distinction, the Court’s prior decisions dealing
with the inevitable discovery rule in no way foreclose the option of it doing
so in a future case. As the New York Court of Appeals in Stith correctly
noted, Williams II, the very case in which the Supreme Court adopted the
inevitable discovery rule, dealt with secondary, and not primary,
evidence. 416 Importantly, the Court in Williams II cited the deterrence
rationale of the exclusionary rule,417 but went on to find that, in the case
before it, admission of the derivative evidence would not further this
rationale. 418 This makes sense in the context of secondary or derivative
evidence—admission of such evidence would in no way work against
deterring a police officer from conducting an illegal search because such
secondary evidence is too attenuated from the illegal search to be properly
654, 662 n.5 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (holding that for inevitable discovery rule to be
applicable, prosecution must “prove that the secondary evidence . . . was gathered by means
sufficiently distinguishable from any illegality so as to be ‘purged of its primary taint’ rather
than deriving from exploitation of the illegality”).
In addition, there is some support for recognition of the primary–secondary evidence
distinction in at least two federal district court decisions. In United States v. Massey, for
example, the district court noted that the inevitable discovery rule—which at that time had
not yet been recognized by the Supreme Court—“would allow indirect evidence to be
introduced, notwithstanding its derivative connection to the excluded direct evidence
resulting from unconstitutional conduct by law enforcement officers, if it were inevitable
that such indirect evidence would have been discovered and acquired from an independent
source in any event.” 437 F. Supp. 843, 855 n.3 (M.D. Fla. 1977) (emphasis added).
Although the Massey decision’s refusal to apply the inevitable discovery rule would
eventually be overturned by the Supreme Court’s decision in Williams II, this does not mean
that the Massey decision’s characterization of that rule is no longer applicable. Similarly, in
United States v. Guarino—a case decided after Williams II—the district court stated in dicta
that “[a]nalysis of the application of the inevitable discovery exception depends upon a
weighing of the facts and a determination of whether the secondary evidence was obtained
by an independent source or by official exploitation of the primary illegality.” 610 F. Supp.
371, 379 (D.R.I. 1984) (emphasis added).
415
See, e.g., People v. Burola, 848 P.2d 958, 962 (Colo. 1993) (“[T]he inevitable
discovery exception to the exclusionary rule applies to both primary and secondary
evidence”); Commonwealth v. O’Connor, 546 N.E.2d 336, 339 (Mass. 1989) (same); State
v. Sincell, No. 19073, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 1656, at *7–8 (2002) (same); State v. Flippo,
575 S.E.2d 170, 188 n.22 (W. Va. 2002) (same).
416
In Williams II, the defendant argued that because his confession to murder violated
his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and was therefore inadmissible, the derivative
evidence obtained as a result of the information learned during that confession—the location
and condition of the victim’s body—should also be excluded from evidence. 467 U.S. 431,
437 (1984). The Court in Williams II rejected this, and held that the derivative evidence—
i.e., the body—was admissible under the inevitable discovery rule. Id. at 447–50.
417
Id. at 444.
418
Id. at 446.
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referred to as a direct consequence of that search. With primary evidence,
on the other hand—i.e., “the very evidence obtained in the illegal
search” 419—admission of such evidence works directly against the
exclusionary rule’s deterrence rationale by allowing police to conduct an
illegal search knowing that, if they find contraband, the evidence will be
admitted despite the initial illegality of the search. As the Oregon Court of
Appeals noted in State v. Crossen, failing to exclude wrongfully obtained
primary evidence “would encourage unlawful searches in the hope that
probable cause would be developed after the fact.”420 Further, prior to the
Court adopting the inevitable discovery rule in Williams II, the majority of
lower federal courts and state courts that had applied the rule did so with
respect to secondary evidence only. 421 This may suggest that, when
deciding Williams II, the Court intended for the inevitable discovery rule to
continue to apply only to secondary evidence as it had before.
Adopting New York’s primary–secondary evidence distinction would
allow the Court to balance the competing interests at play: on the one hand
acknowledging and respecting the deterrence rationale behind the
exclusionary rule while, on the other hand, recognizing the prosecution’s
interest in admitting evidence that is removed from, and untainted by, an
illegal search. Or, as Professor Llewellyn would put it, this approach would
apply the exclusionary rule where the reasons for it—deterrence of illegal
activity on the part of police—are present, while refusing to apply the
exclusionary rule where the reasons for it are no longer applicable—where
the admitted evidence is attenuated from and untainted by the illegal search.
Adopting this primary–secondary evidence distinction would also decrease,
if not completely eliminate, the possibility of police and prosecution
making an end-run around the Court’s holding in Gant by arguing for
application of the inevitable discovery rule to save the very evidence found
during the illegal search. And it would do all of this without having to
overrule any of the Court’s prior inevitable discovery decisions.
There are at least two other ways in which the Court could conceivably
limit the inevitable discovery rule. Although these options are less likely to
be applied by the Court—because the Court would have to overrule its prior
precedent in order to do so—these options have been utilized in several
states and are therefore worth discussing briefly. The first of these

419

People v. Stith, 506 N.E.2d 911, 914 (N.Y. 1987).
536 P.2d 1263, 1264 (Or. Ct. App. 1975).
421
See Stephen H. LaCount & Anthony J. Girese, The “Inevitable Discovery” Rule, an
Evolving Exception to the Constitutional Exclusionary Rule, 40 ALB. L. REV. 483, 508
(1975).
420
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alternative approaches is to raise the burden of proof that the prosecution
must meet in order to benefit from the inevitable discovery rule. 422 In
Williams II, the Court set that burden as a preponderance of the evidence.423
The Court did so based on prior precedent in which it held that “the
controlling burden of proof at suppression hearings should impose no
greater burden than proof by a preponderance of the evidence.”424 The
Court in Williams II stated that it was “unwilling to impose added burdens
on the already difficult task of proving guilt in criminal cases by enlarging
the barrier to placing evidence of unquestioned truth before juries.” 425 The
defendant in Williams II argued that the preponderance standard, which was
used by Iowa state courts, was inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s
decision in United States v. Wade, where the Court required clear and
convincing evidence of an independent source for an in-court
identification.426 The Court in Williams II rejected this argument, holding
that, unlike the problems that come with in-court identifications, “inevitable
discovery involves no speculative elements but focuses on demonstrated
historical facts capable of ready verification or impeachment and does not
require a departure from the usual burden of proof at suppression
hearings.” 427 This aspect of the Court’s holding in Williams II has received
substantial criticism. For instance, former prosecutor Professor Steven
Grossman has stated:
When the Court imposes a relatively low burden of proof upon the prosecution
regarding the likelihood of discovery, it comes closer to requiring a showing that the
evidence could have been discovered as opposed to requiring that the evidence would
have been discovered. A showing of the former does not break the casual chain
between the initial illegality and the ultimate discovery of the evidence, and use of the
inevitable discovery exception in such a situation makes the Court’s analogy to the
428
independent source doctrine particularly suspect.

The dissent in Williams II, authored by Justice Brennan and joined by
Justice Marshall, also disagreed with the majority’s holding that inevitable
discovery need only be established by a preponderance of the evidence, and

422

For a more detailed discussion on the burden of proof required for inevitable
discovery, and an argument in support of raising that burden, see Steven P. Grossman, The
Doctrine of Inevitable Discovery: A Plea for Reasonable Limitations, 92 DICK. L. REV. 313,
351–52 (1987).
423
Williams II, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984).
424
Id. at 444 n.5 (quoting United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 178 n.14 (1974)).
425
Id.
426
388 U.S. 218, 240 (1967).
427
Williams II, 467 U.S. at 444 n.5.
428
Grossman, supra note 422, at 353.
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held that an increased burden of “clear and convincing evidence” should
Further, several states have rejected the
instead be applied. 429
preponderance standard applied by the majority in Williams II and applied
the more exacting clear and convincing standard advocated by Justice
Brennan in his dissent. 430 Although abandoning the preponderance
standard in favor of the clear and convincing evidence requirement would
certainly narrow the pool of cases in which evidence that was otherwise
illegally seized would nevertheless be deemed admissible, it is unlikely that
the Court will overrule its holding in Williams II in favor of a more
stringent quantum of proof.
Another less-likely path the Supreme Court could follow to limit the
applicability of the inevitable discovery rule would be to require the
prosecution to prove that the police did not act in bad faith to hasten
discovery of the challenged evidence. This, however, would require the
Court to overrule its holding in Williams II expressly rejecting imposition of
this additional burden. 431 The Court in Williams II warned that imposition
of such a requirement “would place courts in the position of withholding
from juries relevant and undoubted truth that would have been available to
police absent any unlawful police activity.” 432 The Court went on to hold
that imposing upon the prosecution the burden of proving the absence of
bad faith would “wholly fail[] to take into account the enormous societal
cost of excluding truth in the search for truth in the administration of
justice.” 433 Despite the Court’s rejection of this burden in Williams II,
however, the courts of several states require the prosecution to prove the
absence of bad faith in order to take advantage of the inevitable discovery

429

Williams II, 467 U.S. at 459 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Smith v. State, 948 P.2d 473, 479–80 (Alaska 1997) (following Justice
Brennan’s view in Williams II dissent and holding that prosecution must prove inevitable
discovery by clear and convincing evidence); State v. Lopez, 896 P.2d 889, 907 (Haw. 1995)
(same); State v. Sugar, 495 A.2d 90, 103-04 (N.J. 1985) (applying clear and convincing
evidence standard); see also Proferes v. State, 13 P.3d 955, 958 (Nev. 2000) (seemingly
applying clear and convincing evidence standard, although also discussing preponderance
standard); State v. Garner, 417 S.E.2d 502, 512 (N.C. 1992) (Frye, J., concurring)
(criticizing majority’s rule that inevitable discovery must be proved by preponderance of
evidence, and advocating for clear and convincing standard).
431
467 U.S. at 445. For a detailed argument of why the Court should reconsider its
holding in Williams II and impose a good faith requirement, see Hon. John E. Fennelly,
Refinement of the Inevitable Discovery Exception: The Need For a Good Faith Requirement,
17 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1085 (1991).
432
Williams II, 467 U.S. at 445.
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rule. 434 Further, several legal scholars, including Professor LaFave, have
suggested that this additional burden be imposed. 435 Again, however, in
light of Williams II and the reasons set forth in that decision, it is unlikely
that the Court will impose such a burden on the prosecution.
V. CONCLUSION
After expanding police authority in the context of automobile searches
incident to arrest for nearly thirty years, the Court finally placed a
significant limitation on this type of search in Arizona v. Gant. While the
Supreme Court’s decision in Gant represents a major paradigm shift as to
what is permissible when it comes to searches incident to arrest, the
decision’s effect is more theoretical and scholarly than practical. Despite
the fact that the Court in Gant dramatically limited the authority of police
officers to conduct these searches, evidence discovered as a result of
searches made illegal by Gant is often admitted notwithstanding that
decision. This is because prosecutors are often able to get around the Gant
holding by proving that the evidence at issue inevitably would have been
discovered had the illegal search not been conducted. Further, prosecutors
need only make this showing by a preponderance of the evidence, and the
rule applies regardless of whether the police were acting in bad faith.
If the Court wants to give its holding in Gant more practical effect, it
should adopt the approach taken by the courts of several states under which
the inevitable discovery rule cannot be applied when the evidence sought to
be saved from suppression is “primary evidence”—the very evidence
illegally obtained during or as the immediate consequence of the challenged
police conduct. Under this approach, the inevitable discovery rule applies
only when the evidence in question is “secondary evidence”—evidence
obtained indirectly as a result of leads or information gained from the
primary evidence. Although the Supreme Court has never expressly
recognized this primary–secondary evidence distinction, none of the
Court’s prior inevitable discovery decisions foreclose the possibility that it
could in a future case. Adopting this approach would undoubtedly make it
harder, if not impossible, for the prosecution to admit evidence obtained as
a direct result of a search made illegal by Gant. This, in turn, would further
the privacy interest that a motorist has in his vehicle—an interest that the
Court expressly referred to as important in Gant. Other options would be to
raise the burden of proof placed on the prosecution to prove inevitable
434

See, e.g., Smith, 948 P.2d at 481; Commonwealth v. Sbordone, 678 N.E.2d 1184,
1190 (Mass. 1997).
435
See 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE § 11.4(a), at 244 (3d ed. 1996).
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discovery from a preponderance standard to a clear and convincing
evidence standard, or to require the prosecution to prove the absence of bad
faith before the inevitable discovery rule is applied. However, both of these
latter approaches would require reversal of prior inevitable discovery
precedent and are therefore unlikely to be followed. One thing is for
certain: until the Court does something to limit the applicability of the
inevitable discovery rule, police will have little incentive to comply with its
holding in Gant.

